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ABSTRACT 
 
The study deals with landownership constraints that restrict the supply of brown field 
sites onto the market for redevelopment purposes. The constraints may disturb the 
effectiveness of the land market. As a result, the underutilized area may become 
derelict and needs regeneration in the form of urban renewal programs.  Empirically, 
the study investigates sources of landownership constraints in the area of brown field 
sites in Kuala Lumpur. Data were gathered using interview with selected landowners 
of undeveloped and developed sites to examine why they had developed or simply 
abandoned their lands undeveloped. Qualitative analysis was undertaken to collect 
data from respondents using either direct and/or indirect quotations. The main finding 
is that landowners were unwilling to undertake redevelopment due to landownership 
constraints as revealed by transaction costs involved in the initiatives to transfer the 
indigenous lands. The findings enable various interested parties to strategize their 
actions in the future to redevelop brown field sites in Kuala Lumpur.  
 
Keywords: transaction cost, landownership constraint, brown field sites, Kuala 
Lumpur   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There are two elements that drive the manner in which actors make decisions, 
externally and internally (Djurdjani, 2008).  The former are determined by the 
institutional environment surrounding the actors, whilst the latter is more related to the 
actors themselves which is influenced by cost and benefit considerations (Eggertsson, 
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1995).  According to North (1996), institutions or ‘rules of the game’ provide 
incentives and restrictions which affect human decisions.  As part of institutions that 
govern human decisions and actions, transaction costs which are associated with the 
internal element affect human decisions too. 
 
The way institutions affect transaction costs would subsequently influence 
landowners’ decisions to participate in the supply of land for development. In this 
context, there are three circumstances of possible sources of transaction cost known as 
institutions or ‘the rules of the game’, the existing property and contract rights and the 
transfer of existing property rights (Furubotn and Richter in Benhamm and Benhamm, 
2001).  In addition, there are another three characteristics of transactions; namely 
uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity which characterize the presence of 
transaction costs (Williamson in Petersen, 1995).  In relation to land rights, there are 
two types of land rights that are attached on land which are fixed or legal rights and 
variable economic rights (Lai, 2001).  In term of cost, the former usually is in the form 
of fixed cost and the latter varies depending on the presence of land attributes.  
 
There are therefore, various factors causing landownership constraints on the transfer 
of land rights affecting landowner behavior towards the supply of land for 
development.  Among others are passive landowners (Adams, 1994) and multiple 
ownership of urban land (Adams et al., 2000).  In this context, landownership 
constraint is a complex phenomenon whereby the flow of land onto the market is 
restricted and hence, limits agents’ interactions in the market. As a result, the price of 
land tends to increase due to higher demand compared to the restricted land available 
in the market.  
 
The transfer of lands is one of the initial steps in the land development activities 
(Cadman and Topping, 1995). Transfer of lands does not mean to transfer the land in 
its physical form, but rather the rights therein (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973).  During the 
exchange process, North (1996) says that measuring the valuable attributes of what is 
being exchanged, protecting rights, policing and enforcing agreements are among 
those activities that may produce transaction costs.  According to North (1996), 
institutions reduce uncertainty and so the costs.  Cost does not necessarily be in the 
form of financial terms, but rather in the form of time, opportunity and effort 
(Buitelaar, 2004).  Here, there are transaction costs that include the costs of resource 
utilization for the creation, maintenance, use and change of institutional rules 
(Furubotn and Richter in Benhamm and Benhamm, 2001). 
 
This study is aimed at understanding the landownership constraints of brown field 
sites of indigenous lands in Kampong Baru, Kuala Lumpur.  The study uses 
transaction cost within an institutional economics analysis to explain the way in which 
landownership influences the decision of landowners in defining, maintaining, 
utilizing and transferring the rights for exchange in the market (Benham and Lee 
Benham, 1998).  
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LANDOWNERSHIP CONSTRAINTS 
 
There are various factors forming landownership constraints that influence the supply 
of brown field sites for redevelopment. First, the social factor that influences 
landowners’ decisions to make the brown field sites available in the market for 
development. Passive landowners are those who take no particular steps to transfer the 
sites, even though there is high demand for such lands in the market.  In fact, there are 
landowners who are willing to participate but only on restricted terms and conditions, 
such as the willingness of the potential buyers to buy at a higher price.  Although, they 
are willing to buy at a higher price than the open market value, it happens that the 
offer is not high enough to the sellers. As a result, the transaction of such land is 
aborted and not happening in the market. In addition, there are landowners who are 
expecting higher prices in the near future; the landowners are still looking forward to 
keeping the lands for speculation or for land hoarding purposes (Adams, 1994).  
Moreover, the multiple ownership of the urban land is most likely to perform as a 
constraint which may distort the smooth flow of land supply onto the market for 
redevelopment purposes (Adams et al., 2000).   
 
In the inner urban areas, the land supply constraints generally come from the 
combination of four factors; namely critical physical, ownership, planning and 
valuation constraints (Adams, 1994). Physical difficulties are commonly associated 
with derelict or contaminated areas with bare infrastructure facilities. The 
landownership constraint comes from the landowners who are reluctant to respond 
uniformly to market mechanisms, who are keeping the lands because they are looking 
for a better price in the future or who are keeping the lands due to sentimental value 
towards the lands.  In Kenya, land owners are still reluctant to sell their lands because 
of several considerations.  Among others are (1) land is perceived as a crucial asset for 
the present and/or future subsistence of the family (2) it is a secure form of holding 
wealth and a good hedge against inflation (Green, 1987).  For the low income 
households, the willingness to put the lands in the market area is also affected by the 
degree of uncertainty of their future after they release the lands (Howe in Adams, 
1994). The valuation constraints emerge because of the land value disputes.  In this 
case, the landowner and buyer/developer have different estimation prices of the land.  
Commonly, the landowner’s price is higher than the proposed land developer/buyer’s 
price. Sometimes these market constraints are closely related to the landownership 
difficulties which influence the behavior of landowners.  The planning constraints 
exist whenever the local authorities provide not-comprehensive planning, so that it 
creates uncertainty for the developers and landowners.  
 
With regards to indigenous land, restriction in interests that disallows the transfer of 
land is aimed at protecting it from being eliminated and hence, pushed up the cost of 
changing the ownership. As a result, this has reduced the profitability of any potential 
investment value attached to the land.  In the end, the restrictions are causing the 
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market to get smaller, lower in value and limited in its usefulness for the purpose of 
collateral.  The difficulty of locating owners and the cost of establishing trusts strictly 
affected the ability of owners to develop land and subsequently hindering economic 
development and finally produce land supply constraint (Guerin, 2003).   
 
The inability to sell off the land contributed gradually to the fragmentation of land 
tenure among the successors such as what happened to Native American land tenure 
(Anderson and Lueck in Guerin, 2003).  In addition, multiple ownership increases the 
cost of obtaining common agreement among the landowners, and this reduces the 
willingness of individual owners to put effort into development indecisively. This 
means that the valuable land with indecisive multiple ownerships may discourage 
potential uses to put the land up to highest and best uses (Guerin, 2003). 
 
Consequently, landownership constraints provide direct impacts on the land and 
property market in terms of increasing land price which subsequently push the price of 
developable lands higher in the market. On the one hand, landownership constraints 
create extra burden in the form of higher costs and put limits to the supply onto the 
market and finally prevent the maximization of economic value of the lands (Ismail et 
al, 2009; Priyono, 2008).  On the other hand, landownership constraints may cause 
underutilization and to a certain extent may produce deterioration of surrounding 
properties, leading to an overall decline in the property values nearby (Ambrose, 
2005). 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
  
The empirical framework was designed to assess the applicability of transaction cost 
analysis.  The questionnaires were distributed to the landowners in the study area.  
The purposive sampling technique is used to select the respondents based on the 
current condition of the sites such as the developed-undeveloped lots and lots which 
have been transferred.   
 
The study area is located in Kampong Baru adjacent to the Central Business District 
of Kuala Lumpur which is the biggest area of indigenous lands in Kuala Lumpur. The 
total area of study is 101.02 hectares (excluding two kampongs in the whole Kampong 
Baru area of 112.38 hectares) which under Section 6,  1897 Land Enactment was 
established as Malay Agricultural Settlement (MAS) with the main purpose of 
alienating land to landless Malays in Kuala Lumpur.  Kampong Baru is selected as the 
study area as the city is fast growing in terms of social, political and economic 
development. The current condition of Kampong Baru provides an interesting case 
due to the fact that indigenous lands in Kampong Baru are with restrictions in interest, 
slow land market, slow development activities, and located in central Kuala Lumpur 
area as shown in Appendix A.  
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The total number of lots in the study is 957 lots. A group of 50 undeveloped, 
developed and traded lots were selected for investigation. Out of 50 lots, 47 are 
occupied by individual landowners, the rests are occupied by corporate land owners. 
About 88 percent of dwellings in Kampong Baru (out of the 56 percent of lands in this 
area are categorized under residential land uses) are considered   under-utilized and 11 
percent is vacant or unimproved residential land.  
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Landowners and the brown field sites were taken randomly for investigation.  The 
common respondents’ background is dominated by old people and less to undertake 
development (more than 67 per cent), medium education and less professionalism (87 
percent) and low household income families and, hence less financial affordability 
(85.8 percent have income less than RM 2,000 per month). Whilst, for the site 
characteristics, most of them were inherited, which means that high sentimental values 
to further bequeath, owned by more than one owner which means multiple 
landownership (81 percent), owner occupied and less speculative (95.2 percent) and  
using the site for own use other than occupation such as trading and renting (88.1 
percent).  
 
Transaction costs affecting land supply 
Whenever actors perform land transactions, a fixed cost should be spent as a 
consequence of transferring fixed and legal rights in the form of legal fees and legal 
taxes.  In land dealings, the market has internalized the externality so that the 
transaction cost is already attenuated (Guerin, 2003). However, the landowners 
asserted that the restrictions in interest and the nature of multiple landownership are 
the two institutional factors that seem to be responsible for the creation of transaction 
costs in land dealings. The costs are in the form of opportunity, decision making, 
effort and time taken and actual transaction in the market. Table 1 summarizes the 
activities that produce transaction costs in the land dealings.  
 
Table 1: Activities and type of costs that affect landowners to release the land 
Institutions Activities that produce 
transaction cost 
Type of cost  
 (lot number) 
Restriction in 
interests 
Decision to release land Lose opportunity to have dignity 
and amenities 
 
Multiple 
ownership 
To bring into market and 
development 
Effort and time to get agreement 
among owners 
  
 To make transaction Lose opportunity to get buyer 
and better value  (78 per cent of 
landowners) 
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Transaction costs and the process of land transfer 
During the period 1996-2006, only certain buyers were actively participating in the 
slow indigenous land market. It was recorded that among 43 transactions, only 26 
buyers were actively participating in the land transactions. Three corporate owners 
who have bought more than one lot during 1996-2006 are Naza Properties, and Rah 
Properties who had bought 2 contiguous lots respectively, and two individual owners 
who had bought more than one lot.  The landowner has to approach active buyers such 
as Rah Properties and Naza Properties either to buy or to jointly develop their lands 
(Onn, 2006; Hamisah, 2005).  This means that with a limited market, the sellers have 
to bring about the land to the market and hence, they have to spend extra cost in terms 
of effort to get the best buyers.   
 
Conversely, those few buyers who have been actively participated in the land market 
have knowledge about the potential buyers.  This is due to the fact that the restriction 
in interests may influence the land transaction, since it would only be possible among 
the Malays. The willing seller – willing buyer relationship has always been recognized 
during an ‘arm’s length transaction’. This means that both buyer and seller are acting 
sincerely without undue duress and know exactly the consequences of dealing with 
landownership constraints (Onn, 2006).   
 
There are reasons for landowners refusing to part from their lands. They refused to 
sell off the lands due to the fact that this is the only Malay area in the heart of Kuala 
Lumpur.  In the long run, the identity of the Malays in the urban area will be no longer 
available.  In a way, this means that the transfer will incur high social costs to the 
landowners in the long run. This is not only a matter of economic reason, but also a 
political reason which is synonymous to the survival of the Malays in the urban areas 
(Nik A Majid, 1993).  Table 2 summarizes the institutions, the activities that produce 
transaction cost and the type of cost that may incur in any transaction of the land in 
the area. 
 
Table 2: Institutions, activities and type of cost which affects land transaction 
Institutions Activities that produce 
transaction cost 
Type of cost 
(Lot number) 
Restrictions in 
interests 
 To obtain buyers Opportunity to get the best buyers 
(asset specificity) 
 
 To change institution Opportunity to have dignity  
(60 per cent of landowners) 
Political cost (for government) 
 
Transaction costs and the external factors 
Most of landowners agreed with the argument that the government is responsible for 
land redevelopment. In fact, the role of the government in developing the area is 
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dominant especially during the 1990s where land acquisition had been proposed but 
failed due to landownership constraints (Ismail, 1999; Suleiman, 2000). As a result, 
the landowners believe that the future of Kampong Baru is also in the hands of the 
government.  This perception hinders landowners’ intentions to develop their land.  In 
institutional terms, this phenomenon is known as bounded rationality (North, 1996) in 
which the actors’ decisions are based on the information and knowledge acquired.  
 
There are cases whereby some landowners have been cheated by errant land 
developers during development initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s. They have been 
persuaded to secure a bank loan for development by certain land developers with the 
promise of being partnership and joint venture development schemes. Unfortunately, 
the proposed land development schemes failed to materialize, but their documents of 
title were listed with encumbrances. With the bad experience in their minds, most of 
them would prefer to stay away from development and at the same time, given priority 
to own occupation, renting out or speculating the appreciation in the value of the lands 
(Ismail, 1999). These create social costs to the landownership that constrain the 
landowners’ decisions once they refuse to undertake redevelopment of their lands due 
to risks expected out of undertakings. Uncertainty about the future is another factor 
that produces transaction costs and subsequently affects landowners’ decisions (North, 
1996).  
 
In preparing the planning proposal, the physical attributes of the land become the main 
factor concerning infrastructure and land size. Average size of the site was less than 
808.3 square meters (Ismail, 1999).  To arrive at an economic size of the land for 
development, amalgamation of more than one contiguous small lot has to be done and 
the planning requirements must be fulfilled by landowners. In this context, multiple 
landowners need to come together and agree with the terms and conditions (Ismail et 
al, 2008; Djurdjani, 2008; Priyono N D, 2008).   
 
As Syamsul (2006) mentioned:  
“It isn’t enough to just make a plan. You have to do extra work to materialize the 
plan”. 
 
A corporate owner, who bought a number of lots in Kampong Baru scattered at 
several sites mentioned about the additional cost that he has to pay: 
 
“Holding cost. Due to nature of land-small and narrow, you have to buy a few lots 
around before the land can be properly developed. You must wait for surrounding 
owners to sell”  
 
Besides physical and planning attributes, landownership constraints have also been 
influenced by the marketability of the developable sites.  The completed product of 
the land development can only be occupied or purchased by particular Malay buyers. 
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Therefore, the affordability of those certain buyers may influence the future 
investment value since the future market would be limited to the Malays only. One of 
them mentioned: 
 
“If too high a value (of the land), development cost is high. Selling price (will be) 
higher that middle income Malays cannot afford to buy.  This defeats the original 
intention – to allow the Malays retaining their ownership of Kampong Baru”  
 
Table 3 shows external factors and costs affecting the decisions to develop the sites. 
 
Table 3: Institutions, activities, type of cost in the planning of development 
Institutions/ 
Land attributes 
Activities that may 
produce transaction cost 
Type of cost 
(Lot number or case) 
Ownership  Prepare planning proposal Time and effort to get consensus 
Uncertainty (grant not in hand) 
 
Physical attribute Prepare planning proposal Time and effort to get economic 
land size 
Time and effort to amalgamate  
lands 
 
Planning 
regulation   
Prepare planning proposal Opportunities to maximize the 
use of the whole surface of land. 
 
Transaction cost and landowners’ attitude 
As shown in Table 3, combinations of 4 attitudes and the current condition of the 
lands provide 6 possible decisions that landowners have chosen for action.  In the 
table, there are 8 landowners who have 2 basic intentions; namely intention to sell and 
intention to develop. In a way, these are the strategies held by landowners of less 
developed sites. Conversely, many landowners of developed sites are taking the 
initiatives in a positive way with the main reason to grasp the opportunity of capital 
appreciation and good rental income which are available in the market. 
 
Due to no intention to release their lands, they also refused to take up any investment 
thereon. Most of the landowners either refused to sell or were reluctant to undertake 
the development themselves. This resulted in the brown field sites remaining under-
utilized elsewhere in the area. The reasons for these passive behaviors were inherited 
land and would like to further bequeath, financial less affordability, less urgent to go 
for redevelopment and to preserve the Malay identity in the urban areas. Table 4 
illustrates these 6 decisions in a table form.  
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Table 4: Landowners’ attitude and the current condition of the land 
No Attitudes Final/current 
condition 
Lots  
1 Not intend to sell 
Not intend to develop 
 
undeveloped 10 lots 
2 Intend to sell 
(Has not been sold) 
Not intend to develop 
undeveloped 3 lots 
3 Intend to sell 
(Has not been sold) 
Intend to develop 
 
undeveloped 8 lots 
4 Not intend to sell 
Intend to develop 
(Has not proposed proposal) 
undeveloped 20 lots 
5 Not intend to sell 
Intend to develop 
(Has obtained approval and/or 
have developed) 
developed 8 lots 
6 Intend to sell 
(Has been sold) 
Sold 1 lot 
 
In relation to the transaction costs, there are various type of transaction costs that 
emerge during the process to supply the lands for development purposes such as 
opportunity costs (to enjoy dignity, to enjoy amenity, to obtain good buyer, to achieve 
better land value, to maximize the use of the land), time (to have consensus among 
landowners, to achieve acceptable amount of compensation, to amalgamate lands, to 
achieve economic land size), effort (to have consensus among landowners, to achieve 
acceptable amount of compensation, to amalgamate lands, to achieve economic land 
size). For the government, the most related cost is political cost; particularly when the 
government changes the current status of MAS area. Table 4 shows that there is a 
relationship between landowners’ decisions, the landowners’ attitudes, the type of 
transaction cost and the sources of cost   that affect landowners’ decisions.  
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Table 5: The relation of decision, landowners’ attitude, sources of costs, type of 
cost and land owners 
Decision  Landowners’ 
attitude 
Sources of costs Type of cost Land 
owners 
1 Not intend to sell 
Not intend to 
develop 
 
Restriction in interest 
Multiple ownership 
Bounded rationality 
Opportunity cost 
Effort 
Time 
 10 sites 
2 Intend to sell 
(Has not been 
sold) 
Not intend to 
develop 
 
Multiple ownership 
Physical characteristic 
Bounded rationality 
Effort 
Time 
3 sites 
3 Intend to sell 
(Has not been 
sold) 
Intend to develop 
 
Restriction in interest 
Multiple ownership 
 
Opportunity cost 
Effort 
Time 
8 sites 
4 Not intend to sell 
Intend to develop 
(Has not proposed 
proposal) 
Restriction in interests 
Multiple ownership 
Physical characteristics 
Uncertainty 
Asset specificity 
Bounded rationality 
Planning regulation 
 
Opportunity cost 
Effort 
Time 
27 sites 
5 Not intend to sell 
Intend to develop 
(Has obtained 
approval and/or 
have developed) 
 
Restriction in interests 
 
Opportunity cost 
 
8 sites 
6 Intend to sell 
(Has been sold) 
  1 site 
 
Table 5 recognizes that in the supply of lands for development, there are 4 
transactions; namely the purpose to achieve intention to sell, achieving intention to 
develop, transferring the rights and obtaining approval for development.  By adding 
the actors involved, the activities in the transaction as well as the manner in which 
landowners may supply land for development, the transaction costs approach in the 
supply of land is shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Transaction costs in the supply of land for redevelopment  
Stage Seller Buyer Activity Transaction 
A. Supply land through land transfer 
(1)Intention 
maturation 
Individual 
owner 
Owners as a 
unity 
To have consensus of 
interest 
 
Initiation 
(2) Land 
transfer 
Previous 
landowner 
New 
landowner 
To make a contract; 
negotiation 
Transfer 
ownership 
B. Supply land through planning proposal  
(1)Intention 
maturation 
Individual 
owner 
Owners as a 
unity 
To have consensus of 
interest 
 
Initiation 
(2) Planning 
approval 
Landowner/ 
developer 
Local 
authority 
To make planning 
proposal and to get 
approval from local 
authority 
Procurement 
 
Intention to maturation means the intention to sell or to develop with a comprehensive 
consideration to the existing internal and external factors.  In other words, the 
intention to sell and to develop the lands is influenced by the existing institutions such 
as restriction in interests and land development regulations as well as the cost benefit 
consideration inclusive of countable and uncountable values.  Initiation is the 
transaction effort with the intention to maturation stage which consists of any (initial) 
steps to ignite and to achieve the intention to either sell or develop the land.  For 
example, landowners have no intention to release the land because they are eager to 
take advantage of the opportunity to enjoy amenity and dignity currently existed in the 
market (3 landowners). Some landowners refused to sell their lands since they hesitate 
to spend the cost in the form of time and effort to achieve consensus among them (2 
landowners).  
 
In the supply of land through land transfer, the previous owner is the seller and the 
new owner is the buyer.  Activities involved in this stage are getting information on 
the land price and buyers and to negotiate as well as to make a contract.  Ownership is 
the object to be transferred.  From the empirical data, a landowner of lot 31 failed to 
transfer the land because restriction in interests have produced asset specificity so that 
only limited buyers can be found. 
 
Procurement is the transaction to supply the land through a planning proposal. 
Procurement means the seller is expecting something, for example the planning 
approval by fulfilling planning requirements established by the authority.  In this case, 
the seller is the developer or landowner, the buyer is the local authority.  Any cost 
spent to fulfil requirements and to get approval is considered as part of the transaction 
costs.  
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In the transfer of indigenous land rights, the restrictions in interest play important 
roles limiting the transfer of land from a seller to a buyer. The landowners see 
restriction in interests as a mean of preserving the dignity and amenities to the Malay 
landowners, and this has restricted the landowners from releasing the land. In 
addition, ownership constraints restrict the market that certain buyers can only buy the 
lands; hence, sellers lost opportunities to get the best buyer and the best price.  
 
In fact, there are linkages between landowners’ behaviour, land attributes, transaction 
costs and land development initiatives.  By measuring the transaction costs, actors 
make decisions such as to sell or to develop the lands. To a certain extent, actors may 
change the institutions if these institutions are no longer capable either to 
accommodate their interests or to solve their problems efficiently.  Positive decisions 
will stimulate development, so that development can be materialized. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
There are two formal institutions that affect actors’ decisions to supply land for 
development in Kampong Baru as indigenous land for Malays and the code of 
valuation practice.  The first formal institution produced Malays’ sentiment to the 
lands and also the ownership restriction.  The second institution caused the refusal of 
landowners to release the lands, or if this system was implemented a big cost has to be 
spent in terms of time and effort. 
 
First, the written rules that there is ownership restrictions in interests that disallowed 
transfer of indigenous lands to non-Malays.  From a property rights point of view, 
restriction attenuates landowners’ right to sell (delineate) the land to any buyers.  
From a land market point of view, this restriction limits the market.  Incomplete rights 
and limited market will reduce the value of the land.  Also, it will be less attractive for 
land developers and financiers for development purposes.  So that the purpose of the 
amendment is to attract more land developers and investors to undertake development 
of Kampong Baru area. As one of the solutions, amendment can be made to any 
individual title through surrendering to government, then re-alienating back to 
registered landowners and amending the restriction of interest to allow foreigners or 
non-Malays to occupy the site.   
 
Second, there are unwritten rules that affect costs and actors’ decisions such as 
landowners’ perceptions on land development, multiple landowners and financial 
difficulties. Passive landowners may refuse selling off their lands or refuse to 
participate in the development initiatives. In this case, more information on the 
property market and encouragement to participate such as entering into partnership or 
a joint venture financial arrangement might be useful. In addition, multiple 
landowners may restrict the flow of supply and push up the cost to get consensus 
among landowners; particularly to determine the future of the lands. The solution is to 
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establish an electronic registration policy that limits the number of landowners and to 
encourage cooperation among landowners to ease joint venture into land development.  
 
Institutions and land attributes will dictate the characteristics of transactions such as 
uncertainty and assets specificity which then produce transaction costs which may be 
in various types of costs such money, time, effort and opportunities.  This transaction 
costs then influenced the landowners’ decision, based on the cost consideration to 
bring the land either in the market or in the land development process.  In the case that 
the transaction costs are quite big and the actors can’t afford it, to change existing 
institutions is an alternative way to overcome the obstacle of the development.  The 
actors’ decisions, to actively or passively participate in the land market and land 
development as well as to modify the institutions, will influence the output of 
development, subsequently affecting the existing institutions or the current land 
attributes.  
 
For the future of the Kampong Baru area, a comprehensive redevelopment planning 
that considers the benefit of all societies should be established; particularly the Malay 
settlement in the urban area. In doing so, a powerful body responsible for the 
redevelopment of MAS area should be founded.  This body consists of at least three 
departments that are responsible to handle the financial aspect, land status and land 
planning aspect as well as the legal aspect.  Prior to the redevelopment, some formal 
institutions have to be reviewed such as ownership restrictions and valuation in 
practice so that asset specificity and uncertainty can be reduced.  In relation to the 
actors’ attitude and the affordability of Malay empowerment, programs for 
landowners and private Malay companies should be taken into account.  
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